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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
V.R. UTAH LIMITED, a Utah 
limited partnership, dba 
V.R. BUSINESS BROKERS, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
-vs-
LEROY GRIFFIN, dba RDK BAKERY 
and RIVERTON BAKERY, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
Case No. 860142 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker, brought 
this action to recover real estate commissions that were due 
and owing under the provisions of two real estate Listing 
Agreements.(Exhibits 2 & 3) 
In 1983, defendant LeRoy Griffin was the owner and 
operator of two established bakery businesses known as R.D.K. 
Bakery in Sandy, Utah, and Riverton Bakery in Riverton, 
Utah.(R.152) During that year he decided to sell the bakeries, 
and he came in contact with representatives of the plaintiff 
for that purpose.(R.153) 
On August 1, 1983, the defendant executed and delivered 
to the plaintiff a Listing Agreement granting the plaintiff 
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the sole and exclusive right to sell the business known as 
R.D.K. Bakery, together with all fixtures, equipment, goodwill, 
trademarks, trade names, accounts receivable and inventory 
associated therewith. By its terms, the Listing Agreement 
had a duration of five months, extending from August 1, 1983, 
to and until December 31, 1983.(Exhibit 2; R.100; R.169) 
On August 17, 1983, the defendant executed and 
delivered to the plaintiff a second Listing Agreement granting 
the plaintiff the sole and exclusive right to sell the business 
known as Riverton Bakery, together with all fixtures, equipment, 
goodwill, trademarks, trade names, accounts receivable, and 
inventory associated therewith. By its terms, the Listing 
Agreement had a duration of six months, extending from August 
17, 1983, to and until February 18, 1984.(Exhibit 3; R.100; 
R.169) 
Under the terms of both Listing Agreements, defendant 
agreed to pay the plaintiff a real estate fee equal to 12% 
of the purchase price obtained for each property, but in any 
event not less than $6,000.00. Both Listing Agreements further 
provided that the real estate commission shall be immediately 
due and payable if the seller, directly or indirectly, enters 
into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (however designated), accepts 
a deposit, or does any other act tantamount to a sale or contract 
to sell without the written approval of the broker.(Exhibits 
2 & 3) 
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The plaintiff aggressively marketed the two bakery 
businesses. Among other things, the plaintiff ran a total 
of 14 separate ads in the Deseret News and Salt Lake Tribune 
and handled 49 ad responses. It exposed the businesses to 
21 potential buyers and located several interested prospects. 
(Exhibit 4) 
On December 15, 1983, Mr. Larry Huston and Mr. Brian 
Cook, selling agents for V.R. Limited, went to the R.D.K. Bakery 
in Sandy, Utah, to meet with the defendant and present an offer 
that had been made by a prospective buyer. When they arrived, 
Mr. Griffin was not present, but another gentleman asked them 
if he could be of assistance to them. Much to their surprise, 
he introduced himself to them as Andy Souvall, the new owner 
of the business. He said that he had closed the deal with 
the defendant on December 10, 1983, and had taken possession 
the following day.(Tr.110; Exhibit 4) 
As they were leaving the premises, Mr. Griffin arrived 
on the scene. After they found a convenient place to meet, 
they presented the offer to the defendant. He was not interested 
in the offer, and he discouraged them from making further efforts 
to sell the property. During this conversation he denied three 
times that had listed the businesses with any other real estate 
company or that he had sold the businesses to anyone. (Exhibit 
4; Tr.112-3) 
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Upon further investigation, plaintiff's agents 
confirmed that on December 10, 1983, the defendant entered 
into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Toula Souvall, thereby 
agreeing to sell both bakeries to her. Defendant accepted 
a down payment of $40,000.00 from the buyer, and the buyer 
then took possession of both bakeries.(Exhibit 1; R.98-9) 
In selling the bakeries, defendant was represented 
by Mrs. Helen Hooper, who was a real estate broker with a 
separate and unrelated real estate company. She testified 
that her involvement in the sale was based upon other Listing 
Agreements that the defendant had signed with her company. 
(R.141-2; R.170) This suit followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I : Defendant signed two Listing Agreements 
with the plantiff that both provided that the real estate 
commission would be immediately due and payable if the seller, 
directly or indirectly, sold the property without written 
approval of the broker. The property was sold to a third party 
without such approval, and plaintiff is entitled to the real 
estate fees under the provisions of the two Listing Agreements. 
POINT NO. II: Under Utah law, fraud and misrepresenta-
tion must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The 
trial court properly applied that standard to the evidence 
of fraud and misrepresentation in this action. 
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POINT NO. Ill: Defendant failed to show the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. On the contrary, 
the evidence shows that the agents of the plaintiff had no 
knowledge that defendant had previously listed the property 
with another real estate company, and they had no reason to 
know that they did not have a sole and exclusive listing on 
the property, as provided in the Listing Agreements. 
POINT NO. IV: The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered by the court are supported by substantial 
evidence, and they are binding upon this court on this appeal. 
POINT NO. V: The Utah Real Estate Commission Rules 
and Regulations prohibiting the payment of double commissions 
does not govern any part of this action. The trial court 
properly interpreted the language of the Rule and held that 
.the action by the plaintiff did not constitute a violation 
of the Rule or an attempt to obtain a double commission. On 
the contrary, the plaintiff is merely enforcing a valid agreement 
that was signed by the defendant knowingly and voluntarily. 
POINT NO. VI: The amount awarded to the plaintiff 
was the lowest amount stated in the contract, and defendant 
should not be heard now to complain about the award of the 
minimum figure stated in the contract. The award was based 
upon the contract. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL 
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE VERDICT 
AND JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE 
COURT IN THIS ACTION. 
Defendant admitted that he signed the two Listing 
Agreements that were received in evidence as Exhibits 2 and 
3. He further admitted that he sold the properties to a third 
party while those Listing Agreements were in full force and 
effect.(R.170-1) A Purchase and Sale Agreement was received 
in evidence as Exhibit 1. 
The two Listing Agreements involved in this action 
gave the plaintiff an exclusive right to sell the two bakeries 
that were owned by the plaintiff. The authority to sell the 
properties was clearly given to the plaintiff with the right 
to receive a commission therefrom. Paragraph 4 of the contract 
recites as follows: 
Seller agrees that the commission shall be immediately 
due and payable if the seller, directly or indirectly, 
enters into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (however designa-
ted) , accepts a deposit or does any act tantamount to 
a sale or contract to sale without the written approval 
of the broker, and the cancellation or recision of any 
of the foregoing acts shall not act as a release of seller 
for such liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld and approved a similar 
paragraph in a real estate listing agreement in the case of 
Chumnev v. Scott, 14 U.2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 (1963). In holding 
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that the broker was entitled to his commission when the listing 
seller sold his property to a third party within the period 
covered by the agreement, the court stated as follows: 
Moreover, the type of 'exclusive right to sell* real 
estate listing involved in this action has been universally 
upheld. The nature of the real estate business, wherein 
the broker is paid only if the sale is made, would seem 
to make the contract provision herein in question a 
reasonable one. 
Mr. Larry Huston, a representative of the plaintiff, 
testified during the trial that the plaifitiff company had never 
given any approval to the sale of the property to Toula Souvall. 
The exclusive listings give the plaintiff a right to collect 
its full commission on both properties. The evidence strongly 
supports a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT APPLIED THE PftOPER 
STANDARD OF PROOF WHEN IT 
REQUIRED A SHOWING OF FRAUD 
AND MISREPRESENTATION BY 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Based on a tortured interpretation of the Utah case 
of Baldwin v. Vantage Corporation, 676 P.2d 413 (1984), the 
defendant asserts that the court erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove fraud and misrepresentation on the part of plaintiff's 
real estate agents by clear and convincing evidence. Defendant 
claims that such evidence need be proved only by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
Utah law does not support this assertion. The Utah 
Supreme Court has had many occasions to define the elements 
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of actionable fraud. Representative of these declarations 
is the one found in Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P. 2d 951, which 
summarizes the evidentiary requirements of fraud as follows: 
We have in the past stated that one claiming fraud 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence all of 
the following: (1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the one making the misrepresentation 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly knowing 
he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; (6) that the other party acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to its injury and damage. 
All of the above elements must be shown by clear 
and convincing evidence, and each of the elements of fraud 
must be present before actionable fraud can be shown. As noted 
in the next portion of this Argument, the evidence presented 
by the defendant on the issue of fraud and misrepresentation 
fell far short of proving the elements and the degree required 
by the Cheever case. 
POINT NO. Ill 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SUSTAIN 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE 
OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION. 
As an affirmative defense to this action, defendant 
claimed that he was induced by the fraud and misrepresentation 
of plaintiff's agent to sign the Listing Agreements. He also 
claimed that plaintiff's agent, Diane Ossinger, was told that 
the properties had been listed with another broker and that 
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no fee would be payable to the plaintiff unless the property 
was sold through the plaintiff's efforts. 
The evidence on the questions of fraud and knowledge 
are closely related, and that evidence requires careful scrutiny 
in this case. Both Larry Huston and Brian Cook testified that 
they had never been informed that defendant had a previous 
exclusive listing on the property. Huston said the company 
would not accept a listing from someone who had previously 
listed with another company. Mr. Douglas Miller gave similar 
testimony on that point, but the Miller testimony was more 
important on the question of whether plaintiff was aware of 
the previous listing. He testified that Diane Ossinger, the 
lady agent who took the listing, was somewhat new to the real 
estate business, so he accompanied her to defendant's place 
of business to train and assist her. He filled out the 
information on the Listing Agreement himself and then handed 
it to the defendant for signature. Defendant appeared to read 
the information on the form and then signed it. He heard the 
entire conversation that took place at that time, and he 
testified that nothing was said to him or the other agent about 
other listings. He stated further that he would have rejected 
the listing if he had been told that Helen Hooper had also 
been given authority to sell the property. Mrs. Hooper testified 
during the trial that she knew nothing of the second listing 
given to the plaintiff. 
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Defendant asserted in his testimony that he had 
revealed information about the Hooper listing to Ms. Ossinger 
when he listed the properties with the plaintiff. But his 
own testimony on cross-examination belies this assertion and 
shows that it never took place. 
During the trial Mr. Huston and Mr. Cook testified 
at length about a meeting that took place in the Pizza Parlor 
next door to the R.D.K. Bakery in Sandy on December 15, 1983. 
They both testified that when they arrived at the business 
to present an offer to the defendant for the purchase of the 
properties, Mr. Andy Souvall advised them that he was the new 
owner and that he had just purchased the business. When 
defendant arrived and the parties went to the Pizza Parlor 
to discuss the offer, Huston asked him three times if he had 
listed the business with another real estate company. Each 
time defendant denied that he had done so. Huston also asked 
him three times if he had sold the business. Defendant also 
thrice denied that he had entered into a contract of sale. 
When counsel for the plaintiff asked him on cross-examination 
if he had told Huston and Cook at the Pizza Parlor that he 
had previously advised Diane Ossinger of the Hooper listing, 
defendant answered, "No, I did not.M(R.172) 
A simple analysis of the information given or withheld 
by the parties at the December 15th meeting clearly shows that 
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defendant was lying about what he told Ms. Ossinger. If he 
had told her that he had another listing, and if she had told 
him that he would not have to pay a real estate fee unless 
the property was sold by the company, as he claims, then he 
would have had no reason to lie to Huston and Cook. He would 
have readily admitted both the prior listings and the sale 
of the properties on the belief that he was in full compliance 
with his understanding of the Ossinger-Miller conversation. 
Why deny the Hooper listing and the Souvall sale if he thought 
that there was no obligation to the plaintiff under the two 
Listing Agreements? The honest and proper thing would have 
been to immediately contend that no real estate fee was payable 
because no sale had been made by the plaintiff company under 
the Listing Agreements. 
The lies told by the defendant at the Pizza Parlor 
meeting reveal his true understanding of the Listing Agreements. 
He must have understood that he would be liable for the full 
real estate commission if he sold to a third party. To do 
this, he must have read and understood that portion of the 
contract. The natural thing to do when faced with that situation 
at the Pizza Parlor was to lie about the arrangement in hopes 
that the plaintiff would never find out about the sale. As 
often occurs when untruths are spoken in court, the defendant 
became entangled in his own web of lies. The evidence clearly 
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shows that no fraud was committed by any agents of the plaintiff. 
Defendant has failed to establish even the first element of 
fraud referred to in the Cheever case. 
There are other elements of fraud that defendant 
has failed to show in this case. There was no evidence to 
show that defendant relied upon anything that the plaintiff 
said. What he wanted to do was list the property as many times 
as possible so that he would have a better chance to sell it. 
From the outset, he had no intentions of complying with the 
terms of the Agreements. Defendant did not prove actionable 
fraud on the part of the plaintiff, and the defense of fraud 
and misrepresentation was properly rejected by the court. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE LISTING AGREEMENTS SIGNED 
BY THE DEFENDANT WERE VALID 
AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS 
UNDER UTAH LAW. 
This court has held that the trial court retains 
the prerogative to determine the facts in a breach of contract 
action. See Santi v. R.G.W.R. Co., 21 U.2d 157, 442 P.2d 941. 
Defendant asserts in its Appeal Brief that the evidence 
concerning the statements made by defendant to plaintiff's 
agent and the converse statements made by plaintiff's agent 
to the defendant were undisputed at the trial. This assertion 
is not supported by the evidence in the record. The testimony 
of Douglas Miller refutes the assertions by the defendant that 
- 13 -
such statements were made. He was present when the first of 
the Listing Agreements was signed, and because of the 
inexperience of the listing agent, he filled out the form and 
asked the defendant to sign it. He categorily denied that 
there was any discussion about previous listings and about 
payment in the event the property was not sold. The contract 
clearly states the terms upon which the commission had to be 
paid. 
As to the knowledge of the agent concerning the listing 
of the property with UBI through Helen Hooper, the evidence 
is clearly in dispute. As argued earlier in this Brief, 
defendant's own testimony casts serious doubt on his claims 
in this regard. If he had told them about the previous listing, 
why should he be ashamed to tell them about the sale to Souvall 
family? Why deny both the listing and the sale of the property 
made through the other real estate company? 
When the court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in this action, it accepted the plaintiff's 
version of the facts, and that version is clearly supported 
by the evidence in this case. 
POINT NO. V 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING A 
"SECOND COMMISSION11 FOR THE 
SALE OF DEFENDANT'S BAKERIES. 
Defendant asserts on this appeal that the Judgment 
granted to the plaintiff in this action is prohibited by Rule 
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11 of the Utah Real Estate Commission Rules and Regulations 
prohibiting the payment of double commissions. Rule 11 once 
provided that the real estate commission will not condone acts 
of brokers who sell listed properties other than through the 
listing broker. Any practice of the real estate broker that 
subjects the seller to the liability of paying two commission 
is prohibited. Defendant reasons that since he paid Helen 
Hooper a commission to sell the property under a listing given 
to UBI, the payment of a second commission to the plaintiff 
would constitute a double commission which is prohibited by 
the Rule. 
A simple analysis of the former Rule belies this 
assertion. The commission was obviously referring to brokers 
who list the property and then somehow manipulate the sale 
in such a manner that the seller is subjected to the payment 
of two commissions. Such a practice may take place when the 
property is sold to another real estate company that somehow 
obtains an advantage through the assessment of a subsequent 
sales commission. 
The drafters of Rule 11 never intended to bar the 
payment of legal commissions earned under the terms of a valid 
and enforceable Listing Agreement. In this case, the defendant, 
by signing several "sole and exclusive1' Listing Agreements, 
has subjected himself to payment of two commissions. There 
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is no evidence to show that the plaintiff took any steps or 
did any acts to require the payment of a double commission 
by the defendant. The plaintiff is merely enforcing a valid 
agreement that defendant signed freely, voluntarily and 
knowingly. It is elementary that the law requires a contracting 
party to carry through on his promises. The courts have always 
held that people are free to contract as they please, but they 
are required to live with the consequences of their acts. 
Defendant relies very strongly on the language of 
Rule 11 of the Real Estate Commission Rules and Regulations 
concerning double commissions. In July, 1985, Rule 11 was 
amended and is now known as Rule 6.6 of the Commission Rules. 
The language has been changed significantly, and the new language 
makes the Real Estate Commission's interpretation of this "double 
commission" problem much different than what is now proposed 
by the defendant. The new language is as follows: 
Rule 6.6 Double Commissions. 
In order to avoid subjecting the seller to paying 
double commissions, licensees must not sell listed 
properties other than through the listing broker. 
A review of the present language of Rule 6.6, shows 
that the purpose of the Rule is to restrict real estate brokers 
from selling listed properties without going through the listing 
broker. This interpretation does not apply to sellers who 
knowingly list the property through several brokers. It 
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certainly wouldnTt prevent the collection of a commission for 
breach of a valid Listing Agreement. 
As the Judge noted in his Memorandum Decision and 
in his comments during the trial, the defendant caused his 
own grief in this case, and neither of the brokers had anything 
to do with the problems that arose from defendant's listing 
the property with more than one company. 
POINT NO. VI 
THE AMOUNT AWARDED TO THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS BASED UPON THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
When defendant argues that plaintiff failed to 
introduce any evidence of the "purchase price" of the property, 
he overlooks the wording of the contract pertaining to the 
commission to be paid to the real estate broker. Both of the 
Listing Agreements provide as follows: 
2. Seller agrees to pay broker twelve (12 % ) , but 
in any event not less than $ 6,000.00, of the purchase 
price. 
Because there had been no sale, the District Judge 
chose to award the lesser amount of $6,000.00 under each 
contract, or a total of 312,000.00 for both Listing Agreements. 
The award was not based upon any purchase price for the property, 
but was based upon the contractual agreement that plaintiff 
would receive not less than $6,000.00. The amount awarded 
was clearly to the advantage of the defendant and was based 
upon the lowest amount awardable in this action. 
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The evidence clearly shows that the property was 
sold for a total of $154,500.00 to the Souvall family. If 
the court had based its Judgment on that selling price, the 
plaintiff would have been entitled to receive a full 12% of 
that amount, or over $18,000.00. Defendant should noting his 
good fortune rather than attacking the court for assessing 
the lower minimum figure stated in the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the issues raised by the defendant on this 
appeal involve questions of fact that were resolved by the 
court on the trial level. In the past, this court has refused 
to disturb the factual finding of the trial court on appeal. 
There is no reason to make an exception to that rule in this 
case. 
The legal matters raised on this appeal such as the 
interpretation of Rule 11 of the Real Estate Commission Rules 
and Regulations and the standard applied for proof of the 
elements of fraud and misrepresentation were properly handled 
by the court at the trial level. There is no reason to reverse 
the trial court's holding on either the facts or on the law. 
The court should affirm the judgment of the trial court and 
award costs to the plaintiff in connection with this appeal. 
DATED th day of September, 1986. 
RESPECTIVE SUBMITTED, 
H. HALPH KLElflf 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
The respondent served the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
this f l - "day of September, 1986, by having four true copies 
thereof delivered by United State Mail, postage prepaid, to 
defendant's attorney of record as follows: 
M. Richard Walker 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841,17 
:
^^<^L 
- 19 -
ADDENDUM 
The respondent attaches hereto as the Addendum to 
the Brief of Respondent the following documents: 
1. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 — Listing Agreement. 
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 — Listing Agreement. 
3. Memorandum Decision 
4. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
5. Judgment. 
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including all fixtures, goodwill, trademarks, trade names 
and inventory associated there****W~"* fj ,-
2. Seller agrees to pay Broker /OS^uAr ( / c * . %). 
but in any event not less than $ (j? 6Q9+- '
 t 0f the 
purchase price. 
3. Seller agrees that if this listing is cancelled or the 
property withdrawn from sale during the listing term by 
Seller, the commission shall become immediately due by 
Seller to Broker. If Seller refuses or is unable to comply 
with the listing terms for any reason, thereby preventing 
disposition of the property during the listing term upon 
the terms set forth above, the commission shall become 
immediately due by the Seller to the Broker. 
4 Seller agrees that the commission shall be 
.".v.u'jiats!y ciu* snH »&ysb2o i.r the Sel\iT, 'Jnect'v z: 
indirectly, enters into a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
(however designated) accepts a deposit or does any other 
act tantamount to a sale or contract to sell without the 
written approval of the Broker, and the cancellation or 
recission of any of the foregoing acts shall not act as a 
release of Seller for such liability. 
5 In any case where the deposit and/or down payment 
have been forfeited, the deposit shall be split 50% to 
Employment Accepted by VR Business Brokers 
OFFICE NAME 
Seller and 50% to Broker. 
6. The Seller acknowledges that it has supplied the 
listing information above and Seller warrants such 
information to be true and correct. 
7 Seller agrees to pay the full commission set forth in 
this Agreement to the Broker in the event the property 
described herein is, within one year after the termination 
of this Agreement, sold, traded or otherwise conveyed to 
anyone referred to Seller by the Broker or with whom 
Seller had negotitions during the term of iftTi Agreement 
8. This Agreement shall commence (or/the day aj}d. 
year set forth below and continue untiUSfcj.^/, 19^15* 
9. Should any suit be commenced to enforce the 
Broker's rights herein, in the event the Broker is 
successful the Seller agrees to pay the Broker the 
expenses connected therewith, including attorney's fees 
10. Seller hereby acknowledges that he has read this 
agreement and has received a copy of it. 
11. If Seller is a partnership, corporation or other entity, 
the person(s) signing on behalf of such entity hereby 
represent(s) and warrant(s)that he/she has, or they have 
the authority to enter into this contract on behalf of said 
entity. 
Of FICE ADDRESS 
LISTING AGENT. 
M$*.,4L Seller 
<?-/-jf_3 
ALL OFFICE^ ARE INDEPENDtN TL Y OWNED AND OPERA TED 
W H ' U - v ' fHCE CANARY — SELLER PINK - SALESPERSON G U L D - RBS-VR|$ P O BOX 499 CANTON MASSACHUSETTS 0?0?1 
BUSINESS 
BROKERS9 Managers initials 
Business Type L i 
city—~RiVsT~hi?^ l ^ T " 
Phon. No. cP-TY—Ztt? 
L I S T I N G A G R E E M E N T , , , , 
Base Mo. Rental , 1 . T 6 J Lease Exp. Date 
Opt ion __: Years Security on Lease $ P ^ ^ \ 
Terms and Conditiow« r?Y&^ ^ isisJs /04^12-s 
Misc. Lease In fo rmat ion 
Corp. &Vor F i rm Name 
ffi*^°fe»£ r^kcr^) 
Seller's N . m . JL*> £ * K ) / ? . ^ 5 J - / S Q M V > 
Addreit /0^7^/^L 
City **V> • ! / # 
at f W / W ^ AW-/k. 
j £ Phone N o . , 
Bldg. S u e . 
No. Employees 
Payroll $ <?O £> 
£l XhL fe 
L a n d l o r r i j R r Y ^ rf/Zty*t«&*>lPht>nm 
Property Mgr. " i S V f r w * * ^ Phone 
Estab. j 2 j £ a . Y r s . Pres. O w n e r J 2 y £ i 
Furn . , Equip. $ 
J L 
Yrs. 
icL in purch. price 
^ ^ L -
S32-2L 
/ "•> ^ J fZJ Seat* 
4- F.T. -A 
Inventory at Cost & mcJ. in purch. price 
Month ly Receipts $ . . , Seller w i l l prove 
Month ly Net Prof i t & / ^ i T ^ ) Sailer w i l l prove 
P.T. 
Per 
License Required — 2 L a 
Park:n(j _ 
J-. . . . . Purchase Price * 3 & } < ^ 9 / ^ 4 n c l u d a i S <£>, ^ ^ C o m m . / ^ 
M o n t h ^ ^ r ^ O ^ ^ ^ W £ * ^ D o w n Payment * / f f 3 r * P Includes $ < ^ 2 / Z 2 ^ ^ 0 o m m . / / / - ^ 
5 > ^ i e ^ * > ' £ . ( 7 Seller w i l l carry balance at $ iOB£*{£j2 per mon th incl . 
. % interest on unpaid ba 
Days O p e n / 7 7 ^ T T Closed On 
Hours Open /n—~7 
-JVt^ld% 
. lance 
^ f Addi t iona l Terms 
REASON FOR S A L E . rf^TVtf t^^y-ri J22^ r-5") 
~n~ A m o u n t $ . 
A m o u n t £ w ^ ~ 
L IENS/ENCUMBRANCES Tota l * — O ~ 
Payments $ _ r L £ - L T L Interest n _ £ L r % Holder ~- C> — 
Payments %-" 0 ~" Interest— Q-~ % Holder ~ " C) ~~~ 
Phone. 
Phone . 
A l l trade f ixtures and equipment included except the fo l lowing i tems: . 
R E M A R K S 
S O L E A N D E X C L U S I V E . R I G H T T O SELL 
1 The Sel ler he reby engages the Broker , on a sole and 
exclusive basis, to sel l t h e above descr ibed property, 
i nc lud ing a i l f i x tu res , goodw i l l , t r ademarks , t rade n a m e s 
and inventory assoc ia ted t h e r e w i t h j 
2. Sel ler agrees to pay Broker 7 ^ ^ ' ^ i/&-%). 
but i n any event not less t h a n $ &f &G*(C^ , of the 
purchase pr ice. 
3 Sel ler agrees t h a t if t h i s l i s t ing is cance l led or the 
property w i t h d r a w n f r o m sale du r i ng the l is t ing te rm by 
Sel ler , the c o m m i s s i o n sha l l become immed ia te l y due by 
Sel ler to Broker If Sel ler r e fuses or is unab le to comp ly 
w i t h the l is t ing t e r m s for any reason , the reby p reven t ing 
d ispos i t ion of the p roper ty du r i ng the l i s t ing t e r m upon 
the te rms set fo r th above, the c o m m i s s i o n sha l l become 
i<ri(.ii)uiaio-ly duo by t he Sel ler to t he BroUer 
4 Se l l e r ag rees t h a t the c o m m i s s i o n sha l l be 
immed ia te l y due and payable if t h e Sel ler , d i rect ly or 
ind i rect ly , en te rs i n t o a Purchase and Sale A g r e e m e n t 
(however des ignated) accepts a deposi t or does any o ther 
act t a n t a m o u n t to a sale or con t rac t to sel l w i t h o u t the 
w r i t t e n approval of the Broker, and the cance l la t ion or 
rec iss ion of any of the fo rego ing acts sha l l no t act as a 
re lease of Sel ler for s u c h l iab i l i ty . 
5 In any case w h e r e the deposi t a n d / o r d o w n paymen t 
have been fo r fe i ted , the depos i t sha l l be spl i t 5 0 % to 
Employment Accepted by VR Business Brokers 
OFFICE NAME 
OfFICE ADDRESS 3C}7k lC>~ T^/OO j , / f t ' C I ^ 
"H4QEP 
Sel ler and 5 0 % to Broker. 
6 The Sel ler acknow ledges tha t it has suppl ied the 
l i s t ing i n f o r m a t i o n above and Sel ler w a r r a n t s such 
i n f o r m a t i o n to be t rue and correct . 
7 Sel ler agrees to pay the fu l l c o m m i s s i o n set f o r th m 
th i s A g r e e m e n t t o the Broker in the event the proper ty 
descr ibed here in is, w i t h i n one year after the t e rm ina t i on 
of th is A g r e e m e n t , so ld, t raded or o the rw i se conveyed to 
anyone re fe r red to Sel ler by the Broker or w i t h w h o m 
Sel ler had n e g o t m o n s d u r i n g the te rm of th is A g r e e m e n t . 
8. This A g r e e m e n t sha l l c o m m e n c e on the day and . 
year set fo r th be low and con t i nue u n t i i ^ ^ ) fif^ & / 
9 Shou ld any sui t be c o m m e n c e d to enforce the 
Broker 's r ights h e r e i n , in the event the Broker is 
success fu l the Sel ler agrees to pay the Broker the 
expenses connec ted t h e r e w i t h , i nc lud ing a t to rney 's fees 
i ncu r red . 
10 Sel ler hereby acknow ledges tha t he has read th is 
ag reemen t and has rece ived a copy of i t . 
11 If Sel ler is a pa r tne rsh ip , corporat ion or other ent i ty , 
the person(s) s ign ing on behal f of such ent i ty hereby 
represent(s) and w a r r a n t ( s ) t h a t h e / s h e has , or they have 
the au tho r i t y to en te r in to th is con t rac t on behal f of said 
ent i ty . 
""•TXid f. 
Seller 
LISTING AGENT. •4 
Seller 
DATE. "j-i7~?3 
' t ~ < mc.E 
^ ALL OfFtC£S ARE 4 EPENOENTL Y OWNED AND OPERA TEO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
V R UTAH LIMITED, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, dba 
V R BUSINESS BROKERS, : 
Plaintiff, : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS . : 
CIVIL NO. C 84-367 
LEROY GRIFFIN, dba R.D.K : 
BAKERY & RIVERTON BAKERY 
Defendants. 
The above captioned matter came on for trial before this 
Court at the conclusion of which the Court requested written 
final arguments be submitted and these were submitted, the 
last being received by this Court on the 23rd of September, 
1985. Plaintiff was represented by H. Ralph Klemm, Esq. and 
defendant was represented by M. Richard Walker, Esq. 
The Court having read the applicable lav/ pertaining to 
the issues raised and the closing arguments of counsel now 
makes and enters its Memorandum Decision on the issues raised 
of (1) the voidability of the contract and (2) the amount 
of damages, if any, to be awarded. 
On the issue of voidability of the contract the defendant's 
liability turns on whether the contract is voidable for some 
reason. The fact which might create voidability is Ms. Ossinger's 
V R LIMITED V GRIFFIN, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
knowledge of a prior "sole and exclusive right to sell" agreement. 
Since there is a controversy over this evidence, both possibilities 
are to be examined. 
On the proposition of no knowledge, if Ms. Ossinger had 
no knowledge of a prior listing agreement then the contract 
is not voidable. The contract would have been negotiated 
at arms length and in good faith by V R Limited or its agent. 
Ms. Ossinger!s statement, if she made it, that "no commission 
would be payable unless V R Limited sold the business" is 
reasonable under these circumstances it would be true, 
subject to the other terms of the contract. 
On the proposition of knowledge, if Ms. Ossinger knew 
of a prior listing agreement then there may be some doubt 
as to her competence but the contract is still not voidable. 
To void or modify the terms of the contract by the oral agree-
ment, if there was one, there must be shown fraud, duress, 
undue influence, etc. The defendant has claimed that V R 
Limited or its agent perpetrated a fraud on him. However, 
the defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence 
the elements of fraud. Specifically, he has not shown the 
element of intent by V R Limited that he rely to his detri-
ment upon its mis-representations of fact. The defendant 
bears the burden of proof in this instance and, therefore, 
the risk of non-persuasion. 
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Further, looking to the contract itself there is no reference 
to any outside agreements and it appears to be complete and 
fully integrated. If this is the case, and it appears to 
be so, then the intent of the parties is found within the 
"four corners of the writing". See Stanger v. Sentinel Security 
Life Insurance Co., 669 P2d 1201 at the page 1205. Here it 
is obvious that the parties intended no other agreements to 
be included in the contract. The assurance that no commission 
be paid except in the event V R Limited sold the business 
can be inferred from the contract. However, there are several 
occurrences specified which result in the commission coming 
due and payable immediately. One of those conditions is a 
sale or a contract to sell by the defendant without the written 
approval of V R Limited. V R Limited never agreed to the 
sale to Souvall. By signing the contract the defendant is 
presumed to have read and understood iit. There is evidence 
that the defendant did read and understand the contract. 
On the question of contract, therefore, this Court finds 
that the contract is valid and therefore enforceable. There 
is no fraud or misrepresentation established by V R Limited 
or its agent and the defendant understood or should have understood 
the terms of the contract he signed. 
On the issue of damages, the Court finds that the damages 
to be awarded the plaintiff is inprecise if considering only 
V R LIMITED V GRIFFIN, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the twelve percent commission provided in the contract. There 
is merit to the defendant's argument that the Court should 
not speculate upon how to allocate the purchase price of three 
bakeries between two of the three bakeries sold inasmuch as 
the payment was a lump sum. The plaintiff's ac^rument that 
the listing price be used would probably result in an inequity 
because the listing price of the two bakeries listed with 
V R Limited totaled more than the ultimate purchase price 
for the three bakeries. 
Since the contract is valid as heretofore determined 
by this Court it is appropriate to look to the terms of the 
contract to assess damages. The contract does specify a minimum 
commission of $6,000 for each listing. This amount would 
undoubtedly be the commission "due and payable" if one of 
the events occurred other than a sale by V R Limited which 
are specified in the contract (e.g., seller withdraws property 
before expiration of term), therefore this Court finds that 
the minimum commission of $6,000 is due the plaintiff and 
that plaintiff may recover attorney's fees as provided in 
the contract. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Klemm, is instructed to prepare 
the appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree together with his Affidavit showing hours spent andhourly 
rate of billing for the assessment of attorney's fees, 
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submit the same to Mr. Walker as required under Rule 2.9 and 
then forward to this Court for signature and entry. 
Dated this 22nd day of October, 1985 
Copies mailed to counsel. 
'ID B. DEE 
DISTRICT JUDGED j y £ S y 
H. DIXON HiNOLEY 
By £4^&^A'K/^ 
Deputy L,<*;k 
»*/-
§*"! L. *:* * **•---^ U 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for 
Bar No. 1838 
500 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 328-2206 
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DEC f ^ 
H. IJixon Hin'dte/.'CrerKord 0>fet. Court 
Dy 4 i _ 
!
-J Ceoutv C'erx 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
V R UTAH LIMITED, a Utah 
limited partnership, dba 
V R BUSINESS BROKERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEROY GRIFFIN, dba R.D.K. 
BAKERY & RIVERTON BAKERY, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
H-3LH 
Civil No. 084-376 
Judge David B. Dee 
This matter came before the court for trial on August 
21, 1985, with the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. Plaintiff 
and defendant were represented by their respective attorneys 
of record. The court having received evidence in documentary 
form and from witnesses called to testify on behalf of the 
parties, and the court having received arguments of counsel 
in written form pertaining to the issues of fact and law to 
be resolved in this action, and the court being fully advised 
in the premises, now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a limited partnership that is duly 
licensed to do business as a real estate broker in the State 
of Utah. Under the terms of that license, the plaintiff is 
authorized by Utah law to list and sell all kinds of real estate 
properties, including business opportunities of all kinds. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and the listing contracts referred to in this 
action were executed in said County and State. 
3. At all times relevant to this action, defendant 
was the owner and operator of two established bakery businesses 
known as R.D.K. Bakery and Riverton Bakery. 
4. All of plaintiff's agents who participated in 
the listing and sale of defendant's properties were duly licensed 
an authorized by the State of Utah to engage in the sale of 
real estate in this State. 
5. On August 1, 1983, the defendant executed and 
delivered to the plaintiff a Listing Agreement granting the 
plaintiff the sole and exclusive right to sell the business 
known as R.D.K. Bakery, together with all fixtures, equipment, 
goodwill, trademarks, trade names, accounts receivable and 
inventory associated therewith. By its terms, the Listing 
Agreement had a duration of five months, extending from August 
1, 1983, to and until December 31, 1983. 
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6. On August 17, 1983, the defendant executed and 
delivered to the plaintiff a Listing Agreement granting the 
plaintiff the sole and exclusive right to sell the business 
known as Riverton Bakery, together with all fixtures, equipment, 
goodwill, trademarks, trade names, accounts receivable and 
inventory associated therewith. By its terms, the Agreement 
had a duration of six months, extending from August 17, 1983, 
to and until February 18, 1984, 
7. Both of the Listing Agreements referred to herein 
further provided that the agreed real estate commission shall 
be immediately due and payable if the seller, directly or 
indirectly, enters into a purchase and sale agreement (however 
designated), accepts a deposit or does any other act tantamount 
to a sale or contract of sale without the written approval 
of the plaintiff. 
8. Defendant further agreed in both the Listing 
Agreements to pay not less than $6,000.00 as a commission for 
the sale of the property. 
9. After the Listing Agreements were signed, the 
plaintiff undertook efforts to find a buyer for both of the 
bakeries. In connection therewith, they placed the properties 
on the multiple listing board and advertised the properties 
for sale in newspapers. They showed the properties to potential 
buyers on several occasions, and they otherwise made a reasonable 
effort to sell the properties. 
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10. The R.D.K. Bakery and the Riverton Bakery, 
together with a third bakery known as R.D.K.-Winegars, were 
also listed by the defendant, on July 22, 1983, with UBI Business 
Brokers, and the listing contract also provided that UBI Business 
Brokers had a sole and exclusive right to sell the property 
for the defendant. The listing contract ran from July 22, 
1983, to and including June 22, 1984. 
11. On December 9, 1983, the defendant sold both 
bakeries to Mrs. Toula Souvall. The sale was made without 
seeking or obtaining the written approval of the plaintiff. 
A full real estate commission was paid to UBI Business Brokers 
by the defendant. The defendant thereby violated the provisions 
of the two Listing Agreements referred to herein and became 
immediately liable for payment of the commission under both 
Listing Agreements. 
12. The minimum commission payable under each of 
the Listing Agreements is the sum of $6,000.00, and the court 
finds that this amount is a fair and reasonable commission 
to be paid to the plaintiff under the terms of each of the 
Listing Agreements. 
13. Under the terms of the Listing Agreements, the 
defendant further agreed to pay the plaintiff all expenses, 
including attorney's fees,in connection with any suit that may 
be commenced to enforce the plaintiff's rights under the con-
tracts. The parties have stipulated and agreed in open court 
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that the sum of $2,000.00 is a reasonable amount to be awarded 
to the plaintiff for attorney's fees in this action. 
14. The listing contracts which form the basis for 
this suit were negotiated at arms length and in good faith 
by the plaintiff and its agents. Any statements made by 
plaintiff's agent in indicating that no real estate commission 
would be payable unless the plaintiff sold the business were 
true, subject to the other terms of the contracts. 
15. The defendant has failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the plaintiff perpetrated any fraud 
upon him. The elements of fraud have not been established 
in this action. In particular, defendant has failed to show 
that plaintiff intended to defraud or mislead the defendant 
to his detriment. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes 
the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over this action and 
over the parties named herein. 
2. The Listing Agreements executed by the parties 
on August 1, and August 17, 1983, were valid and enforceable 
contracts which were legally binding upon the parties to those 
Listing Agreements. 
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3. The defendant was not fraudulently induced to 
execute the Listing Agreements, and the Agreements are not 
voidable for this reason. 
4. The Listing Agreements were not voidable by the 
defendant for any reason, but were fully enforceable by the 
court. 
5. Upon the sale of the property to a third party, 
the defendant became liable, under the terms of both contracts, 
for payment of the minimum listing fee of $6,000.00 stated 
in each of the Listing Agreements. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant in the total sum of $12,000.00, plus interest accruing 
thereon at the legal rate from and after December 9, 1983, 
together with an attorney's fee in the sum of $2,000.00. 
7. The payment of the commissions by the defendant 
to the plaintiff does not constitute the payment of a "double 
commission" as that term is defined in Rule 11 of the Regulations 
of the Real Estate Commission. In this instance, the listing 
broker did not subject the seller to the liability of paying 
two commissions, as prohibited by the regulation, but the 
defendant caused his own liability by signing a second exclusive 
Listing Agreement with the plaintiff. 
DATED this 21 O day of December, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing this /^ day of December, 
1985, by mailing a true copy thereof, by United States Mail, 
postage prepaid to defendant's attorney, M. Richard Walker, 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
LS *J li* _ 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Bar No. 1838 
500 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 328-2206 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake Countv Utah 
NOV 1 2 1985 
H. D<xoi5-Hi.ncll§y.,Cl9Cl(r3ra.Did. Coun 
B y ^ ^ v. J *'**;*~. ^r -. *. ^ 
v Deoutv Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
V R UTAH LIMITED, a Utah 
United partnership, dba 
V R BUSINESS BROKERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEROY GRIFFIN, dba R.D.K. 
BAKERY & RIVERTON BAKERY, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
J U D G M E N T 
C$-3C7 
C i v i l Ncu_C84-^?£— 
This matter came before the court for trial on August 
21, 1985, with the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. Plaintiff 
and defendant were represented by their respective attorneys 
of record. The court having received evidence in documentary 
form and from witnesses called to testify on behalf of the 
parties, and the court having received arguments of counsel 
in written form pertaining to the issues of fact and law to 
be resolved in this action, and the court being fully advised 
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in the premises, and the court having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $12,000.00 as a real estate commission 
under the terms of the two Listing Agreements that form the 
basis for this action. 
2. Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against 
the defendant for interest accruing to and until the date of 
Judgment in the sum of $1,068.49. 
3. Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against 
the defendant for attorney's fees in the sum of $2,000.00, 
plus court costs in the sum of $183.65. 
4. Interest shall run on the Judgment at the rate 
of 12% per annum, as provided by Utah law, until paid. 
DATED this / ? — day of November, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
WSTCT COURT JUDGE 
/ . . . -fc f 
( } ^ J.CLEfjK ) 
By~y 
v
 Denutv Clerk 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE
 / 
2>^/ Cat* i)<Pr~ 
Served the foregoing this _IZ_T clay °^ MbuJu^ uLiSS', 
1985, by mailing a true copy thereof, by United States Mail, 
postage prepaid to defendant's attorney, Richard Walker, 4685 
South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
